SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

LAW DIVISION: CIVIL PART

HUDSON COUNTY

DOCKET NO.: HUD-L-4499-20

A.D. #

FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER)

Plaintiff,

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION

CITY OF JERSEY CITY, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF THE) CITY OF JERSEY CITY,

VS.

Defendants.)

Place: Hudson County Courthouse

(Heard Via Zoom)

Date: August 12, 2021

BEFORE:

HONORABLE JOSEPH TURULA, P.J.Cv.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

BASSAM GERGI (Fair Share Housing Center)

APPEARANCES:

BASSAM GERGI, ESQ., Attorney for Plaintiffs

PHILIP ADELMAN, ESQ., (Assistant Corporation Counsel) PETER BAKER, ESQ. (Corporation Counsel) Attorney for Defendant City of Jersey City

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(Amicus)
Attorney for Intervener NJ Appleseed

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(Motion commenced at 2:31 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. We are on the record. I'm Judge Joseph Turula, I'm the presiding judge in the Civil Division in the Hudson vicinage. And I am on this screen coming from you -- coming from the Justice Garibaldi Courtroom on the second floor of the Brennan Courthouse at 583

Newark Avenue. We're on the record. That means my court clerk was just over there with a mask on, and was more than six feet away is recording this through the CourtSmart system. His name is Dave Arce if there's a need for this matter to be recorded.

I understand there are many people here who are not -- are more or less the gallery people who sit in the courtroom if we were there. Glad you are here. It's important that you are here, this does involve your community or whatever reason you're here. I would ask that those folks mute your microphones if you haven't already done so. Because unlike a council meeting, there's no public portion of this.

This is going to be an argument, a legal argument in the matter of <u>Fairs Share Housing Center</u>, <u>Inc</u>, <u>versus City of Jersey City and the Municipal</u> <u>Council of the City of Jersey City</u>, which is docket number HUD-L-4499-20. There are some attorneys that

are involved in that and I'm going to get their 1 2 appearances now. So for Fair Share Housing Center Inc, 3 if you could enter your appearance please. 4 MR. GERGI: Good afternoon, Judge. My name 5 is Bassam Gergi, counsel for Fair Share Housing Center. 6 THE COURT: All right. For the City of 7 Jersey City? MR. ADELMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 8 9 Philip Adelman, Jersey City Law Department on behalf of 10 the City of Jersey City and the Jersey City Council. 11 MR. BAKER: Your Honor, Peter Baker, 12 Corporation counsel on behalf of the City of Jersey 13 city. 14 THE COURT: All right, nice to see you Mr. 15 Baker. Whenever there's two attorneys from the same 16 organization, I always just give this boilerplate 17 language that even though there are two folks, great, 18 two minds are better than one, but only one can make the argument. 19 20 So whoever draws the straws on that one 21 that's up to you gentlemen. Also there is an amicus, so counsel if you can enter your appearance, please. 22 23 MS. STEINHAGEN: Renee Steinhagen, New Jersey

Appleseed amicus in support of Fair Share Housing

summary judgment motion.

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THE COURT: All right. A few people have come in late, so I'm going to admit those folks at this time. I can see one of them is on the legislative body of Jersey City. And I'm just going to say for the late arrivals, please mute your microphones, because it's hard to make sure that the recording is done correctly and again the only people who will be speaking are the attorneys and myself.

This is a prerogative writ action that was filed by Fair Share and it comes by way of summary judgment. Both -- or all attorneys have briefed the issue. So before we get into the argument, I must say and I say this with just so for clarity, in a preliminary statement submitted by one of the parties, there was some language that follows and I'll read some, but Jersey City has historically been one of the most ethnically, racially and socially economic diversities in the country. It's prime location neighboring Ellis Island and a stones throw to Manhattan have made it a natural starting spot for these many waves of daring dreamers who have traveled to the United States in search of opportunity.

I'm not going to read the rest of page one of the preliminary statement submitted in this brief. But that language does not belong in a legal brief. It may

go into a letter to the editor, perhaps some kind of other type of medium, but it is not legal argument. I just want to go down further and it says, the influx of luxury developments that cater almost exclusively to high-earning professionals has squeezed the many families who have lived and worked in Jersey City, et cetera, et cetera, again that language is not -- should not belong in any brief whether it's a preliminary statement or not.

So that being said, let me just jump right into it, I'm going to turn the question to Jersey City. There was some questions during the council meeting that the ordinance had not gone to the Jersey City Planning Board. In these papers it is indicated that in fact it has. So Mr. Adelman or Mr. Baker whoever is doing the argument, was this ordinance sent to the Jersey Planning Board, and then what happened next, sir?

MR. ADELMAN: Again, thank you for the time to speak, Your Honor. This ordinance was in fact referred to the Jersey City Planning Board. I know Your Honor has read the papers. So even before the May 7th, 2019 meeting on August 15th, 2018 the council adopted a resolution authorizing the Planning Board to do a study in order to propose an inclusionary housing

ordinance for affordable housing.

examine report and a housing element report, which were presented to the Jersey City Planning Board in April of 2019. Both of those reports were approved and essentially constituted amendments to the master plan. After that an ordinance was prepared by the Division of planning and referred to the Jersey City Planning Board on May 7th of 2019.

The ordinance that was prepared and given to the Jersey City Planning Board, admittedly is not identical to the ordinance that was ultimately passed in October of 2020. However, at the same time as the papers demonstrate, the two ordinances, the one that was actually adopted and the one that was referred to the Planning Board are virtually identical.

And as you saw in the certification of Ms.

Tanya Marione, it identifies all of the similarities

between the two ordinances. Thus, confirming that this

ordinance did in fact go before the Planning Board.

Now Fair Share is going to say that there are

differences and that the differences in the ultimate

ordinance that was adopted are not presented to the

Planning Board.

The distinction and the important thing to

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remember is that the purpose of the Planning Board reviewing the ordinance and considering the ordinance is to confirm that it's consistent with the master plan. That was done, based upon the original ordinance that was submitted. The differences that have been highlighted by Fair Share in their reply brief, have —do not impact and have nothing to do with the master plan.

So while those differences may not have been formally before the Planning Board, the substance and the meat of this ordinance was -- was put before the Planning Board. So all of the essential components of the ordinance itself that was ultimately adopted were referred to the Planning Board, were accepted by the Planning Board. It was then sent to the City Council. The City Council considered it. The City Council arranged for various revisions in the format that was ultimately adopted in October of 2020.

So it's the City's position that there's no dispute that this ordinance was presented to the Jersey City Planning Board as required under the Municipal Land Use Law.

THE COURT: All right. So the next question is you are familiar with your submissions and the submissions of your adversaries in this case, and where

-- because I could not find, but maybe I'm mistaken, where is there an acknowledgment that the governing body reviewed the Planning Board's determinations, reports on the ordinance?

MR. ADELMAN: Reviewed the determinations on the ordinance that was reviewed in May of 2019?

THE COURT: Well there's an ordinance that comes before the City Council.

MR. ADELMAN: Yes.

accordance with the law, the ordinance was referred to the Planning Board. They did something. Eventually something came back to the City Council. There were changes. But was there ever any acknowledgment of what the Planning Board did, their determinations, their reviews, lack of review or anything of that nature?

MR. ADELMAN: By the City Council you mean?
THE COURT: Yes sir.

MR. ADELMAN: In the -- well we know based upon the May 7th transfer that it was referred to the Planning Board, and we know that everything that was reviewed by the Planning Board was then passed along to the City Council. The -- in the whereas clauses of the ordinance that was passed, predominantly I think numbers, you can count them, numbers six through nine,

those whereas clauses are consistent with and almost identical to many components of the housing element update that was prepared by the Jersey City Planning Board.

So that in and of itself demonstrates that the council had to have considered these reports, considered the original ordinance and made whatever changes they thought were necessary.

THE COURT: Now when you say the ordinance, I want to follow. I have the ordinance here in front of me. And the whereas, of course the whereas are not numbered as they are never numbered. And you're saying it's what paragraph just so I can follow?

MR. ADELMAN: In other words if you start at whereas clause number $\sin z$

THE COURT: Nearly 40% of Jersey City household are a cost burden?

MR. ADELMAN: Yes. So that's six and then seven, eight, and nine, those whereas clauses all of that information is in the housing element update report, which I think is exhibit C, let me just double check to Tanya Marione's certification. And if you look at pages in that report, if you look at the first page of that report, page one and then pages 19, 20, 27, and 28, you'll see all of those statistics that

were obtained from that report as part of the consideration by the council in passing this ordinance.

THE COURT: So this report is generated by Ms. Tanya Marione M-A-R-I-O-N-E, March 26th, 2019. And wasn't that the basis and correct me if I'm wrong, to send this idea, this draft or whatever you will to the Jersey City Planning Board, because this ordinance came late.

MR. ADELMAN: Yes, the housing element update and the re-examine report which are exhibits, I believe B and C to her certification, were a component of the study that was done at the direct of the counsel from their prior resolution which is exhibit A, and partially form the basis of the ordinance that was presented in May of 2019.

As part of that ordinance, the NW Financial was retained to assist and perform various calculations in preparing this ordinance. So for example if you look at the ordinance in section, I believe it's 187-5(d), there's a tiered section of payments made in lieu — that can be made in lieu of affordable housing. Those calculations were based on information from NW Financial, which also gives a basis to this ordinance.

The whole premise here is that the plaintiff has the burden -- well let me take a step back, this

ordinance and the City Council's actions are presumed to be valid. The case law says that under Fanelli
Versus City of Trenton
135 M.J. 582; Bryant, 309
M.J.Super.
596; Witt v. Borough of Maywood, 328
M.J.Super.
432, the City's ordinance and their actions in the information in the ordinance are all presumed to be valid. The plaintiff has the burden to show that this ordinance is arbitrary and capricious.

They have not met that burden. At this point, the only thing that the plaintiffs have shown, or provided, or proffered is simply speculation and conjecture about kickbacks and free wheeling deals that are going to take place as a result of this ordinance.

THE COURT: All right. So let me direct you,
Tanya Marione, M-A-R-I-O-N-E, is the director of the

Jersey City Planning Division. She submitted a

certification in this matter. I'm sure you're familiar
with it.

MR. ADELMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: On page three of her certification which was (indiscernible) and it contained where you mentioned those reports a minute ago, she says the following at paragraph 15,

"As stated herein, the included ordinance was referred to the JCPB and is substantially similar to

the ordinance. After the May 7th, 2019 JCPB meeting," for the record that means Jersey City Planning Board, "the INCL.ordinance was issued to the council who thereafter arranged for revisions to be made to the included ordinance and the final version was the ordinance that was enacted by the counsel which now forms the subject matter and plaintiff seeks to vacate."

My issue with that and I don't know if you've had the opportunity to follow it is when not all of that sentence, but part of it, she says it was issued to the council. And this is where I have an issue and I'm going to have a question, and she says who thereinafter, meaning the council arrange for revisions to be made to the included ordinance and the final version was the ordinance that was enacted.

Is there not a Rule 1:6-6 violation, she is opining to what someone else did as opposed to what she did or she caused to have done? Because she's saying they looked at the ordinance. They changed the ordinance. And they being, I guess the entire -- no, it's the entire City Council. Isn't there a problem there?

MR. ADELMAN: I don't think that's a problem because the Jersey -- the Planning Board originally

considers the ordinance. They submit it to the City Council. The City Council then can review it and decide whether to accept it, reject it or revise it. And I think it's fair for her to even if she was not involved in the Council's decisions for any of us to conclude that revisions were made subsequent to the issuance of the original ordinance and were -- were arranged by these revisions, or arranged by the City Council and thereby adopting the final form of the ordinance that we're now discussing today.

So while she may not have personal knowledge of what exactly happened in terms of revisions, I think it's a fair presumption or fair conclusion to make based on the circumstances.

THE COURT: No, she's not allowed --

MR. ADELMAN: And based on her --

THE COURT: -- to conclude -- she is not allowed to give opinions in a 1:6-6 violation. But let me move onto something else.

<u>Jennings versus the Borough of Highlands</u>, 418 <u>N.J.Super.</u> 405, 405-424 (APP. DIV. 2011), the Court there, this was a mobile home issue a prerogative writ matter, in which there was a change to the mobile -- the ordinance to allow for -- about a mobile home and changing the zoning.

1	The Court said
2	MR. ADELMAN: Judge.
3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	MR. ADELMAN: I can't hear you.
5	THE COURT: I said the case is <u>Jennings</u> 418
6	<u>N.J.Super.</u> 405 at 425
7	MR. ADELMAN: Judge.
8	THE COURT: in that matter could you
9	hear me now sir?
10	MR. ADELMAN: Judge, I can't hear you. I
11	can't hear you.
12	THE COURT: Well our microphones are let
13	me just see. My microphone is on sir and we are
14	recording. Let me just check with my court clerk, can
15	you hear me on CourtSmart, sir?
16	COURT CLERK: I do, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: All right.
18	MS. STEINHAGEN: I can hear you here, Your
19	Honor.
20	MR. ADELMAN: I apologize, I didn't hear,
21	something must have cut out on my end, that's my fault.
22	I apologize.
23	THE COURT: Okay, so you're back.
24	MR. ADELMAN: I heard you
25	THE COURT: Are you back with us now?

MR. ADELMAN: Yes, I'm back with you. I heard Your Honor say <u>Jennings</u>.

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THE COURT: Okay. Jennings versus Bryant (sic) and in that case there was a change of zoning and a prerogative writ access filed. So I'm not going to go into all of the facts, but there was a change of the ordinance. It was similar to this review of the Planning Board had to review the ordinance because it was an MLUL. The Court at 425 in a similar vain the Court said, we believe the members of the governing body acting pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26A, owe an applied duty under the MLUL as to at least acknowledge that they reviewed the Planning Board's report. And they further said the record in this case provides us little toppings that any review occurred. Moreover, we believe that a remand to the governing body would be futile and a vain effort to backfill the missing acknowledgment, and we decline to order a do over.

What the Court is saying there in a sense was all right, the ordinance was referred to the Planning Board. The Planning Board did their duty under the MLUL and it came back and the record in the Appellate Division, there's no record that the governing body which herein would be the City Council of Jersey City, but the governing body acknowledged the review of the

Planning Board, here it says report. But here I've looked through this submissions, where is it? I don't have it that says we the governing body, whether in a resolution or someone said we've reviewed it, and here's what we're going to do. They're not bound. I'm not arguing in anyway that the counsel is bound to what the Planning Board says.

But there's no sense in sending an ordinance to the Planning Board, they do whatever they're supposed to. It comes back and there's nothing in the record that says that they have at least reviewed it, reviewed it and declined it, reviewed it and accepted it. Reviewed it, or just as the Court said here, acknowledge that they reviewed the Planning Board's report or I guess you could use the word work, or their efforts, or their ordinance. Where is that sir?

MR. ADELMAN: I want to make sure that I'm clear if what Your Honor is asking is that you're asking for whether or not there's something in the record confirming that the counsel itself reviewed reports and information from the Planning Board. Is that the question?

THE COURT: Well let me say it another way so that I'm clear. It's -- I don't think there's a dispute of fact, because I have to take all the facts

that could be in dispute in favor of the non-moving party, Jersey City. So Jersey City says we have this ordinance and it was referred to the Jersey City Planning Board, and then it came back from the Planning Board. Okay, I'll accept that as true. When it came back, I'm saying where is there an acknowledgment by the governing body that they have reviewed the Jersey City's planning, report, ordinance, work, whatever the word you want to use for that, of this ordinance before they made their decision?

MR. ADELMAN: Well I think that's reflected by the whereas clauses that I pointed out in the sense that if you're asking whether they reviewed the word that the Planning Board did and the reports that they prepared the reports themselves in those whereas clauses, that information came directly from the reports, which would demonstrate --

THE COURT: Let me challenge you this. Ms.

Marione on March 26th had this report. The Planning

Board did their work after March of 2019, did they not?

Then the ordinance was passed in 2020. So wasn't this report prepared before the Planning Board did the review?

MR. ADELMAN: I -- I -- I want to make sure that I understand. Was this report prepared before the

Planning Board did their review?

THE COURT: Sir, you're taking the position that there was an ordinance was sent to the Planning Board for their review, and when it came back the City Council passed an ordinance. And in that ordinance they had wherefor clauses that you said came from this report by Ms. Marione on March 26th, 2019.

What I'm saying is that this report was done
-- wasn't it done prior to the referral to the Planning
Board?

MR. ADELMAN: The report is from March of 2019, yes. And the report -- the report was done before the ordinance was sent to the Planning Board in May of 2019. Correct?

THE COURT: So okay that's your answer. I appreciate that.

MR. ADELMAN: I just want to make sure, yeah so the report definitely was prepared before the ordinance went to the Planning Board. But in the transcript of the Planning Board it's clear even in Ms. Marione's certification that these reports — I'm sorry, let me take a step back.

In -- at the April, I believe 9th meeting of the Jersey City Planning Board, these reports were presented to the Jersey Planning Board and accepted and

voting on by the Planning Board. They were prepared at the direction of the City Council pursuant to the ordinance that's attached as exhibit A to Ms. Marione's certification. So thereafter, the reports are prepared, they're submitted and discussed at the April 2019 Jersey City Planning Board meeting.

After that, the -- the division then, and the Planning Board -- well prepares the ordinance, submits it to the Planning Board which was reviewed in May of 2019. And that's the time line.

THE COURT: All right. I understand. I understand what you're saying, sir. Mr. Gergi, same -- I'm not going to give you a different question than I gave Mr. Adelman, but do you -- are you aware of any acknowledgment once the ordinance came back from the Planning Board, any acknowledgment by the governing body here, the Jersey City City Council of their review of the Planning Board's I'm going to say, work, report, ordinance?

MR. GERGI: Judge, to that specific question, there is obviously no acknowledgment in the record of the meeting where the ordinance was adopted, because we know that the City took the position in front of the public, and to it's own council members that the ordinance did not need to be referred. So of course,

there was not acknowledgment of a report, because the position of the City was we don't need to refer it at all, and therefore there was no acknowledgment of any report as a result of referral.

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THE COURT: Now the City is saying, I understand your answer. So let me ask counsel for Appleseed, Ms. Steinhagen, good afternoon, ma'am. Anything you want to add to that question or not?

MS. STEINHAGEN: No, I would not hold myself to the literal answer. I think that what is going on is that in fact, if I understood the papers that were presented by Jersey City, this ordinance was never referred nor was the initial ordinance in 2019 a referral. Rather, the City Council asked the Planning Board to develop and inclusionary zoning ordinance in the context of it's reexamination report.

was not the result of a referral of an ordinance from the City Council. It was generated as a proposed ordinance by the Planning Board. And I will not go further because Mr. Gergi has more information of what happened when that report and that Planning Board ordinance came back to the City Council. It's our understanding that another ordinance was actually proposed by a City Councilman that was then referred

back to the Planning Board and nothing came of it.

That there was no ordinance -- that proposed ordinance that was generated by the Planning Board as an outcome of it's reexamination report, not as a referral of a proposed ordinance, did not go any further in the City Council meeting. There was no first reading of it.

The referral in 26A and 64 incorporating 26A requires a first reading and then a referral to the Planning Board, and then a report, and then coming back for a second reading and a consideration at that point. And we're having here a discussion that is making up a story after the fact because there was no proposed — there was no referral after first reading, and there was no report coming back that was considered before second reading.

THE COURT: All right. Let me -- let me go back over to Mr. Gergi. So Mr. Adelman is saying they followed the procedures. You may be taking the argument that in fact, as Ms. Steinhagen has said that there was never really the referral of the this ordinance. But this is a summary judgment motion. So Mr. Adelman is saying that the facts are this, and you're saying the facts are that. If there's a dispute of material facts which is it, don't I have to for

purposes of a summary judgment motion, I know this is a little beyond the people watching but either the facts as Mr. Adelman says it are true, and then we go with the arguments from there out or there is a dispute. What exactly happened and if I can't learn exactly what happened from the papers submitted, then the motion has to be denied.

Isn't there a bit of an issue here Mr. Gergi?

MR. GERGI: Thank you, Your Honor. I would

respectfully submit that the facts are not in dispute.

We don't dispute that in May of 2019 there was an

ordinance that was proposed and discussed by the

Planning Board. The City doesn't dispute that

Ordinance 20-809 was introduced and wasn't referred

after introduction to the Planning Board.

What is in dispute here is a legal question for Your Honor. Is what the Planning Board did in May of 2019 sufficient to satisfy the referral requirement under the Municipal Land Use Law or is it not? I'm happy to make arguments as to why it's not. I think it's evident why it's not. But there is a legal question posed to Your Honor, not a factual one, the legal question is, is the Planning Board in May of 2019 discussing a different ordinance with different substantive terms that was not introduced and you know,

sufficient, 17 months later when a new ordinance with new terms is introduced to satisfy the referral requirement in the Municipal Land Use Law.

And if Your Honor would permit me one more point?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. GERGI: For all requirements for development ordinances and zoning regulations are so routine and clear as to really be without question. The way this process works in every town in New Jersey is a development ordinance is introduced. At the meeting introducing the ordinance, typically there's a resolution referring that ordinance to the Planning Board. The Planning Board then considers the ordinance, examines whether it is consistent with the master plan, makes findings of consistency or inconsistency, and then provides recommendations to the governing body. The governing body at the second hearing when it adopts the ordinance is supposed to review that report. If there are inconsistencies and it wants to adopt the ordinance anyway, it has to explain why and put that in a resolution.

If there aren't, if there are recommendations it has to acknowledge having seen them and responding to them. Or if it's found consistent and there are no

recommendations it can proceed to adopt it. But ultimately that's the process and that wasn't followed here. And somehow going back in time a year and a half, and saying because a different ordinance was discussed at a different meeting, that somehow eliminated the need a year and a half later to refer the ordinance under the plain terms of the statute, I would submit just doesn't pass muster as a legal question, not a factual question. The facts aren't in dispute. As a legal matter it doesn't pass muster.

Adelman if you would like to take a minute or two, if you have anything you want to highlight for me. I have read the papers. And just so I'm -- I think it's a good -- a lot of times what happens in these courtrooms is the lawyers understand what's happening, but it seems like there is a lot of people here and it may sound like Latin to them. But in oral argument it's not open mic and talk as long as you want, and then you sit down. It's I read the papers, I have a question I'll ask and if there's anything more I need and if the questions are answered I'm ready to go.

But I will give the attorneys brief, very brief, maybe one or two minutes if there's anything you want to sum up, all three of you, because my questions

have been answered thus far. But I do want you to all have that opportunity. Mr. Adelman if you want to highlight something for the next one or two minutes, that we haven't already discussed, or that you need to highlight it for me.

MR. ADELMAN: Yes, thank you, Your Honor.

Just real quickly, the facts as far as whether or not

-- there is a factual dispute. Clearly, there's a

factual dispute as to whether or not this ordinance was

referred to the Planning Board. It's not a legal

issue. Like the fact is that was it referred and

reviewed by the Planning Board, those are facts.

That's not a legal issue.

Separately, I just want to quickly address some of the accusations as far as what the plaintiff has made concerning these -- what this ordinance is going to do or result in, these free wheeling deals or acts that they presume are going to take place. The ordinance does not permit for that to happen. This ordinance was clearly created for affordable housing. And what happens here is a developer -- in order for this ordinance to kick in, the ordinance itself -- or the developer has to ask for additional residential space, whether it's five additional units, or 5,000 square feet. Once that request is made, they're

required to then provide affordable housing.

At that juncture if the developer believes that it is not feasible to provide affordable housing, they then can make a request to say, we'll provide affordable housing off sight, or make a payment in lieu of affording housing, or provide a benefit to the City like a school, or road, something of that nature.

So it's not the City that can go to the developer and say look, if you want to develop you must pay us something, or do something for us. The ordinance requires affordable housing to be created if the developer asks for additional space. Then the ordinance permits for alternatives if it's not feasible. Perhaps maybe there are environmental issues, other issues that don't allow for affordable housing to take place.

The cases that plaintiffs rely on have to do with matters where areas are designated as areas in need of redevelopment, where you can say, yes okay City you designate this area as a needed redevelopment, and you know, we'll give you X. Whereas, here that's not what is taking place. It's the City that is requiring the affordable housing and perhaps allowing for alternatives to take place if it's not feasible based on a request made by the developer and after an

assessment made by the -- by the supervising entity.

So this is all notion of this scheme or that we adopted this ordinance for the pure purpose of taking kickbacks or for legal conduct is completely a farce. The purpose -- both sides want affordable housing. So this whole lawsuit, they would rather have this City have no affordable housing as opposed to what we're trying to do which is good.

You know, based on that alone all of this speculation and conjecture that they offered which has no basis, is not a basis to vacate this ordinance. And as a result and for all of the reasons stated in my papers, the ordinance should be affirmed. If there are any other questions from Your Honor, I am happy to entertain them. And of course, I pass the microphone to plaintiffs counsel.

THE COURT: Mr. Gergi, one or two minutes if there's anything you would want to highlight, if you don't that's fine as well. Go ahead sir.

MR. GERGI: Thank you, Judge. Can I ask one clarifying question Judge before I begin? Is this is the closing argument for the entire argument or just on the procedure issue?

THE COURT: It's the entire argument.

MR. GERGI: Okay. Thank you, Judge. Then I

will just briefly on the procedural, I think the facts they're not in dispute. The City did not refer the ordinance to the Planning Board. The City's own council stated at the meeting it wasn't referred because they didn't believe it needed to be referred. There is written documentation post-dating the adoption where the Director of Housing and Community Development confirms that the ordinance wasn't referred.

And under the Municipal Land Use Law you have to strictly comply with the procedural requirements, otherwise as the Court said in <u>Jennings</u>, the Supreme Court said in <u>Hasbrouck Heights</u> the ordinance is —that's a fatal defect that renders the ordinance void. This ordinance is void for not having all of the procedural requirements set forth by the New Jersey Legislature.

Substantively, Your Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: See how he rules, Guy.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to ask once again that anyone who is not an attorney mute your microphones, because someone just came through. I would ask you to do that right now. Please continue, sir.

MR. GERGI: Thank you, Judge. Substantively counsel for the City states that you know, our

arguments are substantive arguments and based on -- I believe his words were speculation and conjecture. Our arguments Your Honor are based in law. I heard Your Honor's earlier comments at the beginning of today, but if you look at our brief, everyone of our arguments about why this is unauthorized and why it violate public policy as well as substantial precedent in this State, is well-supported and well-established in the case law that dates back decades. It's not just simply one case or the other.

In opposition, the City has not cited any statute, no statute passed by the New Jersey

Legislature that allows them to trade away affordable housing for an unlimited number of community benefits with no standard to determine when or why or how much. I delegates authority in violation of the Municipal Land Use Law to a small group of local officials, and consultation with a council person for the ward where the development is proposed, you know supposedly trade away the affordable housing for these community benefits.

And Your Honor, I think there's case law from this vicinage and from the Appellate Courts that makes it clear that this kind of open negotiation and unbridle authority granted to a municipality to engage

in horse trading, poses a fundamental threat to the Land Use Process. It poses a fundamental threat to the integrity of the process.

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You know, I'm not going to cite the statutes, the limitations set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law that clearly says that it has to be reasonable and necessary and related to the development. It can't just be whatever the City wants at any time. It can accept an exchange for a reduction in affordable housing. You know in Pool Brothers which is the 2008 opinion from the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Court was clear even when the developer is enthusiastically offering to provide a community benefit or some sort of off track improvement, it's impermissible. It's not authorized by statute, because it poses the very real threat that one developers who cannot offer the same won't be able to do the benefit, and it leads to an auction process of bidding for land use approvals.

The City's counsel argued that the City isn't going to demand. The developers have to come to the City and propose a community benefit. But what is the difference, if a developer comes and proposes a community benefit unacceptable and the City says no, what are they going to do, turn around and offer another, and another until they secure the

land use approval they seek without providing the affordable housing.

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Judge D'Elia from this very vicinage talked about the Municipal Land Use Law and the local housing and redevelopment don't permit for these kinds of give backs untethered to any sort of rationally based link to a development. He says, you know, it permits abuse that should not be permissible. So Your Honor, I think procedurally it's clear that this ordinance should be void. I think substantively the City hasn't offered any statute no case law to rebut our arguments and the case law we cite that shows this isn't permissible, especially when it comes at the expense of affordable housing. We respectfully ask for Your Honor to enter an order finding that the ordinance isn't valid on both procedural and substantive grounds.

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Steinhagen, anything you would like to add, ma'am?

MS. STEINHAGEN: Well there's a lot I would like to add, but I realize that it would be inappropriate. I just want to say that we've been talking about things as procedural -- wait a second I did see -- procedural and substantive. And as I pointed out in my brief, this procedural requirement in the MLUL that has to be strictly complied with is

really has substantive import, as I discussed by going to some initiative and referendum earlier cases that were decided that decided that a development ordinance, a zoning ordinance is not just any ordinance that would be allowed to be subject to initiative and referendum, because of the central role of the Planning Board and the expertise.

I think that we can't just play a game of when the Board considered something, there was some report at some point. This has to be strictly complied with, and as both the Court in the Supreme Court in Hasbrouck Hospital and the Appellate Division in Jennings makes clear, any failure to adhere to so-called procedural requirement is fatally defective because of it's substantive input. And it's -- it's sort of not respectful of the central role of the Planning Board, planning principles, et cetera.

Substantively, I just want to set clear from the amicus point of view, the way we use the word corruption is an abuse of entrusted power for private gain. And it doesn't have to include transfers in money, which is what I think the City is responding to. It can be enforcement, it can be enhancement of political power, reputation, or electoral support.

What we're claiming is this ordinance does in

fact codify a process that already is being used by

Jersey City in the development process that does

undermine public confidence and does in effect, it is

what we're calling corrupt, it's an abuse of process.

The (indiscernible) back in negotiations with

developers to trade away affordable housing on a case
by-case basis is what is going on here, nothing more

and nothing less.

The purpose of inclusionary zoning is to provide affordable housing for the most vulnerable in our State. It's not to provide leverage for individual councilmen and City officials to exact community benefits that don't necessarily benefit low- and moderate-income people, but rather fuel a process of gentrification, potentially resulting in displacement of the residents that are currently living there, and increasing the housing costs for residents that remain in the community.

The key vulnerability of the IZO that's before you is both the waiver and the community benefit provision. It is the lack of affordable adequate standards to guide the exercise of discretion. I'm going to say as Justice Brennan articulated back in 1954 in Weiner versus Stanford 15 N.J. 295, 291, unless the provisions of any regulatory ordinance that vest

discretion in officials to grant or to deny an application, "provides adequate standards to govern the deliberations of those having discretionary power" those provisions must be struck as entirely void.

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Now he goes onto quote Macmillian on the same principle indicating that this is a very wellestablished principle of administrative law. Here the waiver has no standard in criteria and the community benefits for which the approving authority in consultation with the councilman from the ward in which the project is to be built, can trade away affordable housing is not an exclusive list, and it doesn't require it to be built on site and it's not proximate to the site or the redevelopment area. And as we show in our brief, this ordinance gives unfettered discretion and it's roots -- such ordinances are routinely struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court and our Federal District Court most recently in Rosedale on the grounds of vagueness, violating due process, and they should be taken this too -- these provisions must be found invalid.

Also what we added from an empirical point of view the researches have found that when municipal governments are given the right to challenge -- the chance to engage in this type of free willing standard

list negotiations, it enables such as the waiver provision, it definitely generates a political patronage system, and it tends to develop. And here, the ordinance gives city officials definitely the unconstitutionability to remove affordable housing requirements for connected developers in sweetheart deals or to arbitrarily impose them on others.

And so finally, the unfettered discretion embedded in the IZO is bound to create misunderstanding and conflict. As we show in our brief, professors from UCLA have noted when governments trade zoning for cash or amenities, the zoning is no longer reliable predictor of future planning. And converting zoning to a tool of fiscal policy, as Jersey City has done already and will continue to do under this ordinance, have by -- they've done this by exacting public schools and other amenities traditionally provided by government, dilutes governments general traditional role as the guarantee of land use policy. It's just land use policy itself becomes less predictable, and everybody becomes dissatisfied with it.

No one on this call and people who are watching say that community benefits are not good things. But affordable housing is a social good as well. And it's a social good that the Supreme Court of

New Jersey has allowed municipalities to exact from developers when they're asking for certain variances and certain enhancements. There is no authority to exact other types of community benefits. And this statute itself must be struck down on substantive grounds as well.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. So what I will -- the attorneys again know how this proceeds.

But what I'm going to just -- there are many people and we should be transparent and open. So this matter was filed challenging the Jersey City ordinance by Fair Share Housing. It's come to this point because there is a motion by Fair Share and the amicus Appleseed, a motion for summary judgment basically to say the case is over, there is really not dispute of material facts, and the ordinance should be struck down. Jersey City sees it otherwise.

Before we got to today's date, there were numerous written exchanges of legal arguments submitted by all of the parties in the case, the City of Jersey City, Fair Share Housing, and Appleseed. We also conducted a conference recently because hadn't been done earlier to make sure that everyone was on the same — you know, on the same track and that we were doing things in accordance with rules and that we were

following those procedures.

Today's legal argument is not someone reading their entire submissions, because I have a stack of papers there, that is probably with exhibits hundreds of pages that we the Court has studied. The oral argument is one that if I have any particular questions, and allow the attorneys to answer those questions, whether they're good questions or not. It depends on who is asking them, I suppose. Then they'll say a little further what their arguments are. Again, it's not like open mic say at a city council meeting. Having been a city councilman over 25 or 30 years ago, I -- you know, it's a different -- it's a different dynamic.

At this juncture, I have two choices I can do, I can reserve the decision and I'll give you the decision later. But I am not going to do that. I'm prepared to make the decision today on this question before me. Not everyone will be happy with it, because it's either going to be one way or another, and then under our system, any party can file leave to or file an appeal with what's called our Appellate Division of the Superior Court.

That's just how the system works, and if they're not satisfied at that point it can go to the

New Jersey Supreme Court. I don't know what will happen from here. I have a feeling, I think my decision is a good one, but I'm a little biased. I think I studied this pretty well and I have some issues here. Not everyone will agree, and that's fair.

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This comes about there's a motion here for summary judgment, I'll explain more of that in a moment, and a motion to strike the answer and impose sanctions upon Jersey City filed by Fair Share. matter is called an action in lieu of prerogative writs and on December 7th, 2020 plaintiff, Fair Share, filed suit against defendant Jersey City and the Municipal Council of Jersey City, collectively I may refer to them as defendants or Jersey City, challenging the validity of the ordinance number 20-089, hereinafter I'm going to call it the ordinance. The ordinance is titled the Ordinance Creating Chapter 187 Inclusionary Zoning of the municipal code requiring the inclusion of affordable housing units and all development projects with residential which have received use variances or increased density in (indiscernible).

On October 7th, 2020 the ordinance was introduced by the Jersey City Municipal Council at it's regularly scheduled meeting on October 21st, 2020. The Council adopted the ordinance by a seven-two vote. The

challenge of course followed. On April 16th, 2021 the

New Jersey Appleseed public interest loss filed a

motion to intervene and appear as amicus curiae in this

matter. The motion was granted on April 16th, 2021.

Again, the motion for summary judgment, a motion to strike was filed and the Court has -- had a briefing schedule. We've had briefs submitted. We've had conferences and essentially again the plaintiff challenges the ordinance and wanted to be struck down that they failed to comply with the Municipal Land Use Law which I'll refer to as MLUL, statutory and mandate process. Bear with me one second. I think somebody has joined us without their mute on. I don't know why that happened.

They violate the MLUL's mandated process, and the ordinance unlawfully enables the Jersey City municipal officials to negotiate for and accept the legal extractions in lieu of affordable housing, in violation of the MLUL and case law. And three, the ordinance violates the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

I will sum up now and very shortly of what the arguments are, that we've heard some of them today. And there's more voluminous arguments been made. But plaintiff has said that the ordinance violates the statutory requirements of the MLUL. Mainly, that the

referral to the Planning Board was necessary and that it did not occur. They assert that the ordinance creates an unlawful scheme that encourages quid pro exchanges between developers and Jersey City officials. The ordinance was ultra virus because Jersey City was not authorized to adopt the mandatory set aside ordinance that enables the City to trade away affordable houses for so-called community benefits. Such a policy would encourage officials to negotiate a case-by-case basis.

Bear with me one moment, please. All right.

They also -- the plaintiff emphasizes the ordinance violates public policy and precedent that this Court must follow. They've also filed a motion to strike and oppose sanctions against defendant City with regards to their answer.

There was some submissions, and in reply to those submissions the plaintiff further argues that the failure to discuss or acknowledge a report from the Planning Board on the proposed ordinance consistency with the master plan is alone fatal, because case law explains a governing body acting pursuant to the N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26(a) owe an implied duty under the MLUL to at least acknowledge that they reviewed the Planning Board's report. That's citing the case of

<u>Jennings</u> 418 <u>N.J.Super.</u> 405, 425 (APP. DIV. 2011). That's their argument.

Appleseed Public Interest Law Center submits some similar arguments. They also say the Planning Board -- the ordinance should be set aside because the Planning Board -- as to the Planning Board it's fatal that the statute clearly mandates and obligation by the Planning Board. They argue that the ordinance allows City officials to engage in backroom negotiations, a trading off affordable housing for other type of items.

The City of Jersey City doesn't agree at all with any of those arguments, as I imagine. They said the defendant -- summary judgment should be denied as the ordinances are virtually identical. Meaning that one was sent, one was adopted, and they were virtually identical. When I say sent, sent to the Planning Board, as the Jersey City Planning Board prepared and presented an ordinance entitled Ordinance Amending and Supplementing Chapter 345.

All right. So they also said at the meeting on May 7th, 2019 the Planning Board passed a motion to adopt the identical ordinance so that, in fact, did comply with the MLUL and then adopted the ordinance. They've said they complied completely with the MLUL.

They also argue that the motion to strike is

not necessary because their answer was based on good faith belief of the responses answer to the complaint. That's an argument for the people listening that has not really been argued that much here today but has been argued in the papers, which is acceptable.

Motions for summary judgment are a type of a motion governed by Rule 4:46-1 of our New Jersey Court Rules, which I'll incorporate by reference. And in those type of motions, the movant here, the plaintiff, must demonstrate that there are no disputes as to the material facts -- the material facts, okay, and not just a fact but a material fact, and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. That's from the case of Brill 142 N.J. 525.

A determination of whether there exists a general issue of material fact requires a consideration of whether the materials presented when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged dispute issued in favor of the non-moving party. That's at 540.

An issue of fact is drawn only if considering the burden of persuasion at trial the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion with all legitimate inferences therefrom favor the non-moving

party, which requires submissions of the issue to the trier of fact. See Rule 4:46-2(c) and <u>Bhagat</u> 217 <u>N.J.</u> 22, 38 (2014).

The Court looked at his matter and I have two really areas that I want to address. The Court has to find that for a summary judgment, that if a material fact has to be found for purposes of the non-moving's favor or in a sense that I have to deny the motion.

The City of Jersey City says the ordinance was sent, and the plaintiff says it was not sent essentially but it doesn't really matter because of their arguments which I'm not going to repeat. But the Court will find for purposes of this motion that I will accept the facts of Jersey City that the motion was sent to the Jersey City Planning Board.

But therein lies a problem. In the certification of Ms. Marione, she writes that at paragraph 15 that -- and I'm going to say it in midsentence, who thereinafter, meaning the City Council arranged for revisions to be made to the included ordinance in the final version of the ordinance that was enacted by the Council, which now forms the subject matter and the plaintiff seeks to vacate. That's a Rule 1:6-6 violation. So Ms. Marione's saying what the Council did not really specifically doesn't give me the

information that I need.

Under the case of <u>Jennings</u>, again I did say this earlier, but I am going to say it again, the process is that an ordinance is then referred to the Planning Board and then they report back. And whether the Council -- what the do with that is of no moment to this Judge or any other Judge. But which is significant is what would be the useful -- why would the statute refer to the Jersey City Planning Board if there would be no acknowledgment that they've done some work? If governing bodies could refer things to Planning Boards and then not really care whatever they did with it would really nullify the law. There would be no point in having it referred if it didn't come back.

And in <u>Jennings</u> at 424 the Court said, we believe the members of the governing body acting pursuant to <u>N.J.S.A.</u> 40:55D-26(a) owe an implied duty under the MLUL to at least acknowledge that they reviewed the Planning Board's report. In the materials, assuming Jersey City is correct that it was sent to the Planning Board, there's never been an acknowledgment of what -- by the municipal governing body of what the Jersey City Planning Board did.

In the case of Jennings they said remanding

to get acknowledgments or an affidavit later from

Councilman whoever saying oh I did mean to say that I

did this. In that Court they said that would be futile

and a vain effort to backfill the missing

acknowledgment. And they would not do a do over. And

therefore, they concluded that it is a material

violation of the Statute 40:50.5(d)-26(a) which is

similar here that's why it was referred to the Planning

Board. So the Court is going to decide that this

ordinance is invalid, the ordinance from the Jersey

City government for that fatal flaw.

Further, and separately apart from my decision, in the ordinance there is a definition section 187.2, the definition of approving authority says, means the director of housing economic development and commerce (HEDC) or his or her designee, the director of affordable housing, the director community development. In the case of an application for a project in a redevelopment zone or redevelopment area, the director of the Jersey City redevelopment agency or his or her designee shall be a member of the approving authority.

So that's the definition of approving authority. If you look further in the ordinance,

187.6(a), it reads the approving authority who I've just listed a moment ago is permitted to approve a reduction in the mandatory onsite affordable housing requirement related to the value of community benefits proposed by the developer. A reduction in the required affordable housing for community benefits will only be considered for projects in a redevelopment area, and must meet the following criteria which talks about an application fee and things that aren't germane to our argument.

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The Court looks on such a question to the case of Nunziato, N-U-N-Z-I-A-T-O versus Edgewater

Planning Board, 255 N.J.Super. 124 for some guidance with regards to this language. So let me say that the Court finds that the legislature specifically provided that the MLUL, that the governing body must require contributions for off track expenses or other items related to caused by a subdivision or site plan to be approved. These contributions are limited to specific categories.

Case law makes it clear that they must be at a minimum some type of relationship between the development to be approved and the activity funded by the contributions. That's N.J. Builders Association

108 N.J. 223, 227 (1987). As a general public policy

the Appellate Division has emphasized that any such contributions or give backs must be based on the goals of sound land use regulation not free wheeling bidding that indicates the approvals are up for sale. That's Nunziato 225 N.J.Super. 124, 134 (APP. DIV.).

The Court is concerned that the way the ordinance is drafted poses significant risk for abuse, favoritism, or bad faith on the part of the municipality and I looked again. I cite to Nunziato and I will quote that case where they said we conclude the kind of free wheeling bidding under review is grossly (indiscernible) to the goals of sound land use regulation. The intolerable spectacle of Planning Board haggling with the applicant over money strongly suggests that the variances aren't for sale. This cannot be a proceeding in which this should not be — should not occur and the proceedings are hereby irredeemably tainted and must be set aside. That's Nunziato who is talking about a Planning Board.

Here, the ordinance is talking about the approving authority, which essentially for this Court is the same dynamic, so I think <u>Nunziato</u> and this Court says that <u>Nunziato</u> is really applicable to what we have here and we're relying upon <u>Nunziato</u>. And for those reasons this free wheeling bidding that the Court in

Nunziato was concerned with, this Court is concerned because the dynamic is such that someone seeking an approval can essentially -- and I don't want to use the word corruption with money in a bag, but say we'll give you a pool and maybe you can reduce our affordable housing. And if it meets the muster of the approving authority, we're done.

So it's two free wheeling. It's something that is not under the case law of <u>Nunziato</u> something that this Court believes is lawful. And the ordinance is struck down for that reason separate and apart from the other reason. Now it's not in any way to imply that the current holders of those positions that are the approving authority are anyway not honorable people, concerned for the continuing development of all of the people of Jersey City. I'm not saying that at all. Nor am I saying that there is corruption. I'm not saying that either.

But the formula for the housing to be reduced is -- violates the Appellate Division in <u>Nunziato</u>, it's too free wheeling, and is subject to abuse. For those reasons the ordinance, most respectfully to the City of Jersey City and their apt corporation counsel and deputy corporation counsels, I am striking the ordinance in it's entirety.

impose sanctions and strike the answer of Jersey City is denied. I don't see there's any need for sanctions. And really that question is moot at this point. All right. That is my decision. All the attorneys well-argued their positions. And I respect the good work. The people of Jersey City should be happy for their corporation counsel, staff and the good job they did, as well as Fair Share who they represent on the Appleseed, who they are representing, they did fine work.

Further the application by Fair Share to

I wish everyone the best. And to all the people on board, I'm glad you're participating in this discussion if you will. At this juncture, I have concluded my decision. I thank you all. I always say if there's anything that we have to tie down I ask the attorneys for anything else. Mr. Gergi, anything sir?

MR. GERGI: No Judge, I think you covered it, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Adelman?

MR. ADELMAN: No, Your Honor, thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you sir. Ms. Steinhagen?

MS. STEINHAGEN: Thank you very much, Your

Honor. Thank you for letting me argue.

THE COURT: Thank you very much as well. And
you're welcome. All right, ladies and gentlemen, what
you can do is you can now hang up. We're going to go
off the court record and we're going to terminate this
call. Thank you.

(Motion concluded at 3:39 p.m.)

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CERTIFICATION

I, Sharon Conover, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CourtSmart, Index No. from 2:31:17 to 3:40:01, is prepared to the best of my ability and in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript of the proceedings, as recorded.

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